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Injunctions in Sovereign Debt Litigation
W. Mark C. Weidemaier and Anna Gelperni
Injunctions against foreign sovereigns have come under criticism on
comity and enforcement grounds. This Feature argues that these objections are
overstated. Comity considerations are important but not dispositive.
Enforcement objections assign too much significance to the court's inability to
impose meaningful contempt sanctions, overlooking the fact that, when a
foreign sovereign is involved, both money judgments and injunctions are
enforced through what amounts to a court-imposed embargo. This embargo
discourages third partiesfrom dealing with the sovereign and, if sufficiently
costly, can induce the sovereign to comply. Nevertheless, this Feature is
skeptical about injunctions in sovereign debt litigation. They are prone to
dramatic spillover effects precisely because they cannot reach their primary
target, the sovereign government. Recent decisions in NML v. Argentina
illustrate the way in which a court's inability to compel compliance by the
sovereign may lead it to impose dramatic andpotentially unwarrantedcosts on
thirdparties, turning traditionalequitable analysis on its head.
Introduction
...............................................
190
I. NML: Building a Better Remedy.....................
.......... 194
II. The Incomplete Case Against Injunctions ........................
199
A. The Comity Objection
...........................
...... 200
B. The Comity Shortfall...................
.............. 202
C. The Enforcement Objection............................204
D. The EmbargoAlternative..............................206
III. The Perils of Injunctions, Revisited...........................210
A. The Stakes of Compliance..............................211
B. The Super-Embargo..................................213
IV. Conclusions.............................................217

f W. Mark C. Weidemaier is a faculty member at the University of North Carolina
School of Law and Anna Gelpem is a faculty member at Georgetown University Law Center and a
nonresident senior fellow at the Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics. For comments
and suggestions, we are grateful to the editors at the Yale Journalon Regulation and to Francine Barber,
Fred Bloom, Lee Buchheit, John Coyle, Jill Family, Adam Feibelman, Amanda Frost, Mitu Gulati,
James Kerr, and Bo Rutledge. We thank Will Chamberlain, Kerry Boehm, and Ben Szany for research
assistance.
189

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 31, 2014

Introduction
Foreign governments that default on their debts can be hauled into
national courts just like private debtors.' Substantive defenses paying deference
to sovereignty no longer stop litigation in its tracks.2 And, in theory, sovereign
defaulters risk the seizure and sale of assets through the usual court-supervised
procedures for enforcing money judgments. It is here that sovereign and private
debtors part ways. Many sovereign assets are immune from attachment and
execution, and sovereigns can easily (if not cheaply) keep the rest away from
creditors. Courts can inconvenience sovereigns; they cannot make them pay.
But money damages are not the only remedy in the judicial toolkit. Courts
can enjoin private defendants-require or forbid them to do things-to remedy
or prevent harm from their behavior. At first blush, it seems that sovereigns
should be no different from private debtors in this regard. Why should telling a
government to perform a ministerial task (for example, to file a piece of paper)
upset it any more than a judgment to pay a billion dollars? On the other hand,
the idea of one government commanding another seems to strike at the heart of
sovereign equality. Worse, national courts cannot impose meaningful contempt
sanctions on other governments or their officials and thus cannot enforce
injunctions in the usual way. The imperative of maintaining comity among
equal sovereigns and the apparently insurmountable enforcement challenge
often are invoked to reject the use of injunctions against foreign sovereigns, or
to argue that injunctions should be reserved for extraordinary cases.
Yet U.S. law clearly leaves room for determined creditors to press for
injunctive relief. The latest example, NML v. Argentina, has produced the most
potent remedy against a foreign government in recent memory. The case arises
out of Argentina's 2001 default on some $80 billion in foreign debt.3 So far, the
Argentine government has restructured over ninety percent of this debt through
I. Many sovereigns waive sovereign immunity when issuing bonds in foreign capital
markets. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, U ILL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014), http://ssm.com/abstract-2180228. Even without a waiver, national courts may have
jurisdiction to hear claims arising out of sovereign loans. See State Immunity Act, 1978 c. 33, § 3(3)(b)
(U.K.) (defining non-immune commercial transactions to include "any loan or other transaction for the
provision of finance"); Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (holding that issuance
of bonds was a commercial activity for which a foreign state might be sued in U.S. courts).
2.
See Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.
1985) (finding the Act of State doctrine inapplicable for denying enforcement to promissory notes issued
by state-owned banks).
3.
Anna Gelpern, After Argentina, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON. 1, Sept. 2005,
http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb05-2.pdf. The crisis has been the subject of many journalistic,
policy, and academic accounts, including PAUL BLUSTEIN, AND THE MONEY KEPT ROLLING IN (AND
OUT): WALL STREET, THE IMF, AND THE BANKRUPTING OF ARGENTINA (2005); MICHAEL MUSSA,
ARGENTINA AND THE FUND: FROM TRIUMPH TO TRAGEDY 41-52 (2002); and Eric Helleiner, The

Strange Story of Bush and the Argentine Debt Crisis, 26 THIRD WORLD
journalist accounts, see infra note 16.
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exchanges in which bondholders traded old bonds for new ones, initially worth
about one-third of the old. The NML plaintiffs are a coalition of distressed debt
funds and retail investors who sat out the restructurings, sued, and launched a
largely fruitless global search for Argentine assets. We refer to this coalition in
the singular and simply as "NML," after the lead plaintiff, an affiliate of hedge
fund Elliott Associates.
Anticipating difficulty enforcing money judgments, NML also pursued an
alternative strategy. It had held some Argentine bonds in reserve and returned
to federal court in New York to demand specific performance of the underlying
bond covenants. In 2012, NML convinced the district judge, and later a panel
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to approve an injunction
designed to pressure Argentina into paying. 4 Under the terms of the injunction,
Argentina may no longer pay the holders of its restructured bonds (the
"exchange bondholders") unless it pays NML in full, an amount now estimated
at around $1.4 billion. Put differently, the injunction allows Argentina to keep
stiffing NML, but only if it also stiffs the exchange bondholders. Rerouting
payments beyond the court's jurisdiction would violate the injunction.
The injunction is remarkable in many respects, not least for treating
massive government debt default as a form of compliance. It bans Argentina
6
from using its money anywhere in the world to pay the exchange bondholders.
7
In response, Argentina has publicly vowed to keep paying the new debt.
Anticipating defiance, the injunction tries to coerce compliance indirectly by

The district court entered the injunction on February 23, 2012. NML Capital, Ltd. v.
4.
Republic of Argentina, Nos. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1707 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1708 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 23, 2012). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the injunction but remanded
for further proceedings with respect to (1) the amount Argentina must pay plaintiffs and (2) the identities
of the third parties subject to the injunction and, potentially, to contempt sanctions. See NML Capital,
Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012). The district court issued an amended
injunction addressing these issues on November 21, 2012. See Amended February 23, 2012 Order, NML
Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, Nos. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1707 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1708
(TPG), 2012 WL 5895784 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012). The Second Circuit affirmed that order on August
23, 2013. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 2013 WL 4487563 (2d Cir. Aug. 23, 2013).
For convenience, we refer to the various orders simply as "the injunction."
See infra notes 32-43 and accompanying text.
5.
6.
This raises important questions of sovereign immunity: the court imposed conditions
on Argentina's use of property located outside the United States, despite the fact that the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) makes such property immune from attachment and execution.
28 U.S.C. § 1602-11 (2006). It nevertheless seems unlikely there will be further judicial review of these
matters. The Supreme Court denied Argentina's first petition for certiorari, filed after the Second
Circuit's first opinion affirming the injunction, although Argentina is expected to raise these issues again
in a second petition for certiorari. Many documents related to the case are available at Argentine
Sovereign Debt, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, http://www.shearman.com/argentine-sovereign-debt (last
visited Feb. 14, 2014).
7.
On Argentina's defiant litigation posture and the role this may have had in producing
the injunction, see W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Ryan McCarl, Creditors' Remedies at the Border ofLaw
and Politics, in SOVEREIGN DEBT MANAGEMENT (Rosa Lastra & Lee Buchheit eds., forthcoming 2014).
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threatening a wide range of legal and financial intermediaries with contempt if
they help Argentina. 8
It is too early to predict the long-term consequences of NML. But it would
be a mistake to dismiss the case as completely sui generis. The precise contract
formula that was the basis of NML's successful claim has grown in popularity
in recent years.9 Sovereign debt litigation has also increased in frequency, led
by well-resourced specialists able to invest in long-term and novel legal
strategies.' 0 The copycat lawsuit brought by Taiwan to collect on Grenada's
defaulted debt less than six months after the Second Circuit's NML ruling may
be a sign of things to come." Private claimants also have pressed for
injunctions or similar relief against foreign sovereigns outside the debt
context.12 As long as creditors have trouble satisfying money judgments, we
expect courts to hear requests for injunctive relief in sovereign debt cases and
in other lawsuits against foreign sovereigns.
This Feature uses NML v. Argentina to explore the use of injunctions in
sovereign debt litigation. We share the widespread skepticism of injunctions
against foreign sovereigns, but we also question the prevailing objections to
this remedy. Part I describes NML; Part II turns to these objections, grounded in
comity and unenforceability. We argue that comity concerns are important but
rarely dispositive, and that enforcement concerns assign too much significance
to the court's inability to impose contempt sanctions. As a practical matter,
8.

See Anna Gelpern, Contract Hope and Sovereign Redemption, 8 CAP. MKTS. L.J.

132 (2013).
9.
Mark Weidemaier, Robert Scott & Mitu Gulati, Origin Myths, Contracts, and the
Huntfor Pari Passu, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 72 (2013).
10.
See Julian Schumacher, Christoph Trebesch & Henrik Enderlein, Sovereign
Defaults in Court: The Rise of Creditor Litigation 1976-2010 (Apr. 15, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssm.com/abstract=2189997. Concern over holdout litigation partly explains the official sector's
unwillingness to impose losses on holders of Cypriot bonds and the continued service of much of
Greece's English-law debt. On the subject generally, see Lee C. Buchheit et al., The Problem of Holdout
Creditors in Eurozone Sovereign Debt Restructurings (Jan. 22, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssm.com/abstract-2205704.
11.
See Exp.-Imp. Bank of the Republic of China v. Grenada, No. 13 Civ. 1450 (HB)
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2013) (order on consent) (ordering Grenada to provide at least ten days notice if it
planned to service existing debt or to alter the mechanism for making payments).
12.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 94 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 1996)
(reversing, on sovereign immunity grounds, an injunction preventing the Republic of the Philippines
from disposing of assets collected from the estate of Ferdinand Marcos); Republic of Philippines v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 80-81 (3d Cir. 1995) (reversing injunction forbidding the
Republic of the Philippines to interfere with potential witnesses and implicitly limiting the Republic's
ability to pursue tax evasion charges against witnesses); Chabad v. Russian Federation, 915 F. Supp. 2d
198 (D.D.C. 2013) (imposing contempt sanctions of $50,000 per day against the Russian Federation for
defying court order requiring it to turn over to plaintiffs religious texts and artifacts); Belize Telecom,
Ltd. v. Belize, No. 05-20470-CIV (S.D. Fla., Aug. 17, 2005) (vacating the court's earlier preliminary
injunction overturning the Government of Belize's decision removing directors from the board of a
company jointly owned with the plaintiff); Superior Provincial Court (Oberlandesgericht) of Linz,
Decision of Mar. 2, 1989, Nuclear Power Plant Injunction Case (No. 2), 86 ILR 578 (Austria) (denying
request by Austrian citizen for injunction against the construction of a nuclear power plant in thenCzechoslovakia).
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both injunctions and money judgments are enforced indirectly, by denying the
sovereign beneficial trade or other relationships with third parties. 13 We loosely
refer to this enforcement dynamic as a "court-imposed embargo." A court's
order is "enforced" when the costs of the embargo induce the sovereign to
comply voluntarily. Money judgments and injunctions implement this embargo
in different ways and thus impose different costs on the sovereign. As a result,
an injunction will sometimes be more enforceable than a money judgment.
Nevertheless, we remain deeply skeptical of injunctions against foreign
sovereigns, both in general and in the NML case in particular. Part III explains
the reason for our skepticism. Courts face a structural predicament that makes it
difficult to balance the costs and benefits of injunctive relief. Our starting
premise is that judges do not want to look feckless and seldom will issue
injunctions unless they believe that the sovereign will feel significant pressure
to comply. But without meaningful contempt powers, courts can apply pressure
only by doubling down on the embargo strategy we elaborate in Part II. To be
reasonably sure of compliance, the court must craft the injunction so as to
inflict significant pain or risk on third parties, thus enlisting them in the
enforcement effort. This turns traditional injunction practice, in which the
threat of harm to nonparties weighs against the grant of an injunction, on its
head.
NML v. Argentina illustrates the potential effect of this dynamic. The
injunction tries to leave Argentina only two options: pay NML or default on a
sizeable part of its public debt. The latter would inflict losses on the exchange
bondholders and have serious social and economic consequences within
Argentina.14 To ensure that default is the only alternative, the injunction also
imposes the risk of contempt sanctions on trustees, securities clearing houses,
and payment systems around the world. The impact of the injunction on third
parties around the world is not an unfortunate byproduct of the remedy, nor a
natural consequence of ordinary procedural rules against aiders and abettors. It
is a deliberate choice, made in light of the fact that the injunction cannot reach
its primary target, to induce third parties to pressure Argentina to comply. 15 If
an injunction is a judicial gamble in which the court stakes its credibility on
compliance, the NML injunction is a gamble with other people's money.

13.
See Section II.D infra.
14.
In 2005, the Second Circuit professed concern for the effect that judicial remedies
might have on the "economic health of a nation." See infra note 141 and accompanying text. Years of
continued public defiance by Argentina may have changed the court's view, along with changes in
Argentina's economic position.
15.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 extends the effect of an injunction to certain
third parties but does not mandate that the injunction reach as far as the plaintiffs and the courts have
extended it. See infra notes 130-139 and accompanying text.
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I. NML: Building a Better Remedy
The NML story has attracted much attention in the financial press and
elsewhere.16 For that reason, we describe the case only briefly and focus our
discussion on the case's injunctive remedy.' 7 After defaulting in 2001,
Argentina restructured its debt through two exchanges, in 2005 and 2010. NML
did not participate in the exchanges and seek to recover the principal and
accrued interest due under the old bonds. NML initially pursued its claims
against Argentina in the usual ways, by obtaining and trying to enforce money
judgments. Its collection efforts have been innovative but mostly unsuccessful.
At various times, NML has tried to seize defaulted bonds tendered in the 2005
debt exchange, central bank funds on deposit at the Federal Reserve Bank of
19
20
New Yorkl9 and the Bank for International Settlements, taxes and revenues
owed by French companies to Argentina,21 the presidential airplane,2 2 and a
military ship docked in Ghana. 23
As a practical matter, NML cannot seize enough assets to satisfy its
judgments in full. Sovereign immunity shields military, diplomatic, and central
16.
For extensive discussion, see Pari Passu Saga, FT ALPHAVILLE,
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/tag/pari-passu-saga (last visited Feb. 14, 2014); and CREDIT SLIPS,
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/sovereign-debt (last visited Feb. 14, 2014). See also Gelpem,
supra note 8; Theresa A. Monteleone, A Vulture's Gamble: High-Stakes Interpretation of Sovereign
Debt Contracts in NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 8 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 149 (2013); Rodrigo
Olivares-Caminal, The Pari Passu Interpretation in the Elliott Case: A Brilliant Strategy but an Awful
(Mid-Long Term) Outcome?, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 39 (2011); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Debt
After NML v. Argentina, 8 CAP. MKTS. L. J. 123 (2013).
17.
Readers familiar with the recent history of sovereign debt litigation will recall a
similar injunction issued in 2000 by a court in Brussels, which blocked the Euroclear System from
processing payments to holders of Peru's Brady Bonds. See Elliott Assocs., L.P., General Docket No.
2000/QR/92, Cour d'Appel [CA] [Court of Appeal] Bruxelles, 86me ch., Sept. 26, 2000 (Belg.). That
injunction was issued ex parte and by a court in Brussels, and was quickly addressed by legislation in
Belgium insulating Euroclear from such litigation. For criticism of that earlier decision, see Lee C.
Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 EMORy L.J. 869
(2004); G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 BUS. LAW. 635 (2001); and Fin.
Mkts. L. Comm., Pari Passu Clauses: Analysis of the Role, Use and Meaning of Pari Passu Clauses in
Sovereign Debt Obligations as a Matter of English Law (Paper No. 79, Mar. 2005),
http://www.fmlc.org/Documents/fmlc79mar 2005.pdf.
18.
See EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 131 F. App'x 745 (2d Cir. 2005).
19.
See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Central de la Repiblica Argentina, 652 F.3d 172
(2d Cir. 2011); EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463 (2d Cir. 2007).
Oct.
22,
2011,
20.
See
Gauchos and Gadflies, THE ECONOMIST,
http://www.economist.com/node/21533453.
21.
For discussion, see Giles Cuniberti, French Supreme Court Upholds Argentina's
Immunity Despite Waiver, CONFLICT OF LAWS (Apr. 2, 2013), http://conflictoflaws.net/2013/french
-supreme-court-upholds-argentinas-immunity-despite-waiver.
Camila Russo, Evading Singer's Dragnet Means $800,000 Flight, BLOOMBERG
22.
(Jan. 10, 2013, 12:58 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-10/evading-singer-s-dragnet
-means-880-000-flight-argentina-credit.html.
23.
See NML Capital Limited v. Republic of Argentina, Accra High Ct., Commercial
Div., Oct. 11, 2012, No. RPC/343/12 (Ghana), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/Ruling%201 1-Oct
-12%201%20(3).pdf.
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bank assets abroad.24 Argentina can keep most non-immune assets safe within
its own borders. 25 But from the creditor's perspective, asset seizure is not really
the point-NML's most audacious attempt to date involved an Argentine naval
vessel by all accounts worth under $20 million, as against a debt of over $1
billion. The point is to induce the sovereign to pay voluntarily by disrupting its
international activities, preferably by cutting off its access to trade and financial
markets.26 If the enforcement action causes political or diplomatic
embarrassment, all the better.27 Yet so far, traditional judgment enforcement
28
tools have not prompted Argentina to pay.
NML's claims for injunctive relief represent a different approach to
recovery. These claims allege that Argentina breached a covenant-the pari
passu clause-in which it promised that NML's bonds would rank paripassu
(in equal step) and that the payment obligations under the bonds would rank "at
least equally" with the rest of Argentina's foreign debt stock. In NML's
reading, the second part of the clause forbids Argentina to pay exchange
bondholders unless it also pays holdout creditors like NML pro rata. 29
The district judge accepted this interpretation, as did a panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.30 Crucially, the courts also embraced

24.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-1611 (2012) (governing the immunity of sovereign
assets from attachment, arrest, and execution).
25.
For a discussion of the evolution of sovereign immunity law in the United States,
see Weidemaier, supra note 1. For evidence from other jurisdictions, see Pierre-Hugues Verdier and
Erik Voeten, How Does Customary International Law Change? The Case of State Immunity (Jan. 24,
2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2106627.
26.
See Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, A Constant Recontracting Model of
Sovereign Debt, 97 J. POL. EcoN. 155, 158-59 (1989); Mark Gersovitz, Trade, CapitalMobility, and
Sovereign Immunity 1-3 (Princeton Univ. Research Program in Dev. Stud., Discussion Paper No. 108,
1983), http://www.princeton.edu/rpds/papers/WP_108.pdf.
27.
This may explain why NML would bother trying to seize a navy ship and the
presidential plane. See Agustino Fontevecchia, The Real Story ofHow a Hedge FundDetaineda Vessel
in Ghana and Even Went for Argentina's 'Air Force One,' FORBES, Oct. 5, 2012,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/10/05/the-real-story-behind-the-argentine-vessel-in-gha
na-and-how-hedge-funds-tried-to-seize-the-presidential-plane. The latter attempt, for example, required
President Kirchner to make diplomatic visits in a chartered plane. See Russo, supra note 22.
28.
Nor have they resulted in the seizure of substantial assets. For rare exceptions, see
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic ofArgentina, 680 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming attachment and
restraining orders against bank account of a subunit of Argentina's Ministry of Science, Technology,
and Productive Innovation); and EMLtd. v. Republic ofArgentina, 2009 WL 2568433, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.,
Aug. 18, 2009), aff'd, 389 F. App'x 38 (2d Cir. 2010) (confirming prejudgment attachment orders
against funds held in trust).
29.
The pari passu clause has attracted extensive scrutiny over the years, much of
which has focused on the uncertain origins and meaning of the clause. See, e.g., MITu GULATI &
ROBERT E. Scorr, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION (2013); Buchheit & Pam, supra
note 17; Olivares-Caminal, supranote 16; Weidemaier, Scott & Gulati, supranote 9.
30.
As interpreted by the court of appeals, the clause prohibits "Argentina, as bond
issuer, from formally subordinating the bonds by issuing superior debt" and also prohibits Argentina "as
bond payor, from paying on other bonds without paying on the [holdouts'] bonds." NML Capital, Ltd. v.
Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 259 (2d Cir. 2012). Although the Second Circuit's interpretation
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NML's proposed remedy. If Argentina's covenant violation had triggered
acceleration and another unenforceable money judgment, NML's gambit would
have failed. Instead, the district court granted, and the appeals court affirmed,
an injunction providing that, "[w]henever the Republic pays any amount due
[the exchange bondholders] .

.

. the Republic shall concurrently or in advance

make a 'Ratable Payment' . . . to NML."31 The court of appeals remanded,
however, for the district court to clarify the details of the injunction.
The injunction operates in an unusual manner. It does not require
Argentina to pay anyone at all. 32 To the contrary, it contemplates two
alternative ways to comply: paying everyone ratably or defaulting on everyone
at the same time.33 As subsequently clarified by the district court, staying
current on the new bonds would require Argentina to pay its debt to NML in
full. 34 Mindful of Argentina's record of defiance,35 the district court threatened
to sanction financial market utilities, trustees, advisors, and anyone else
deemed to act "in active concert or participation" with Argentina if the country
paid exchange bondholders without paying NML. 3 6

of the clause is contestable, we do not revisit that issue. For discussion and criticism of the court's
interpretation of the paripassuclause, see Gelpern, supranote 8; and Weidemaier, supra note 16.
31.
See Amended February 23, 2012 Order, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of
Argentina, Nos. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1707 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1708 (TPG), 2012 WL 5895784, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012).
32.
See NML, 699 F.3d at 263 ("The Injunctions do not require Argentina to pay any
bondholder any amount of money.").
33.
As the Second Circuit panel put it, the injunction allows Argentina to "pay all
amounts owed to its exchange bondholders provided it does the same for its defaulted bondholders. Or it
can decide to make partial payments to its exchange bondholders as long as it pays a proportionate
amount to holders of the defaulted bonds." Id It is not clear what the court had in mind by suggesting
that Argentina might make "partial payments" to exchange bondholders, but payment of anything less
than "all amounts owed" at that time would constitute default on the new bonds, as, of course, would
paying nothing at all.
34.
See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 2012 WL 5895786 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 21, 2012). Total principal and interest due on the plaintiffs' bonds at the time of this writing is
about $1.33 billion.
35.
See, e.g., Transcript of Hearing at 15, NML v. Argentina, Nos. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG)
and 09 Civ. 1708 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2012) ("[A]ny order of this court affirmed by the Court of
Appeals is binding on the Republic and the Republic has the duty to comply. Now as the Court of
Appeals itself noted, the Republic doesn't seem to respect that duty . . . ."); see also Weidemaier &
McCarl, supra note 7; Matt Levine, Argentina Looking Forward to Reading, Ignoring U.S. Court's
Opinion, DEALBREAKER (Feb. 28, 2013, 5:37 p.m.), http://dealbreaker.com/2013/02/argentina-looking-f
orward-to-reading-ignoring-u-s-courts-opinion.
36.
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2)(c). The amended injunction is available at
http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/Arg5-Order-l 12112.pdf. The relevant paragraph, 2(f), extends
the injunction to "(1) the indenture trustees and/or registrars under the Exchange Bonds (including but
not limited to The Bank of New York Mellon fk/a The Bank of New York); (2) the registered owners of
the Exchange Bonds and nominees of the depositaries for the Exchange Bonds (including but not limited
to Cede & Co. and The Bank of New York Depositary (Nominees) Limited) and any institutions which
act as nominees; (3) the clearing corporations and systems, depositaries, operators of clearing systems,
and settlement agents for the Exchange Bonds (including but not limited to the Depository Trust
Company, Clearstream Banking S.A., Euroclear Bank S.A./N.V. and the Euroclear System); (4) trustee
paying agents and transfer agents for the Exchange Bonds (including but not limited to The Bank of
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On appeal, the Second Circuit again affirmed.37 Argentine political
officials have publicly vowed never to pay NML,38 and its counsel stated in
open court that the country would not comply with the injunction.39
Nevertheless, the court dismissed arguments that the injunction impermissibly
exposed exchange bondholders to the risk of default.4 The court declared itself
"unwilling to permit Argentina's threats to punish third parties to dictate the
availability or terms of relief."4 1 The court also declined, on procedural
grounds, to reach many of the arguments raised by payment system
participants. These included arguments by entities such as Euroclear, which is
located in a foreign country and governed by foreign law. The court explained
that payment system participants could raise these arguments "if and when they
are summoned to answer for assisting in a violation of the district court's
injunctions." 42 These arguments will probably never be addressed on the
merits, as payment system participants are likely to stop processing payments
to exchange bondholders rather than risk contempt. 43
If nothing else, NML's legal strategy is ingenious. The apparent goal is to
make Argentina choose between paying NML in full and defaulting on
obligations potentially exceeding $50 billion. The strategy works only if

New York (Luxembourg) S.A. and The Bank of New York Mellon (including but not limited to the
Bank of New York Mellon (London)); and (5) attorneys and other agents engaged by any of the
foregoing or the Republic in connection with their obligations under the Exchange Bonds."
37. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 2013 WL 4487563, at *4 (2d Cir.
Aug. 23, 2013). With respect to the amount owed to NML, the court concluded that the injunction "does
no more than hold Argentina to its contractual obligation of equal treatment." In other words, if
Argentina pays exchange bondholders "even a single installment of interest," it must pay the full amount
it owes NML. Id.
38.
See, e.g., Ken Parks & Charles Roth, Argentina Grapples With Credit-Rating
Challenges, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBl000142405297020370
7604578090781324040470 (quoting Economy Minister Hemn Lorenzino as reiterating that Argentina
will not pay "vulture funds ... despite any ruling that could come out of any jurisdiction, in this case
New York").
39. See infra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
40.
The court also noted that the disclosure documents accompanying the exchange
bonds had warned that holdouts might attempt to "interfere with payments." NML, 2013 WL 4487563,
at *5. The court did not explain, however, the relevance of this fact in light of the court's earlier refusal
to allow NML to block the restructuring. See infra note 141 (noting that the terms of the exchange bonds
squarely contradict the paripassu clause as the court later interpreted it).
41.
NML, 2013 WL 4487563, at *5.
42. Id.; see also id. at *6-7 (noting that objections based on the asserted lack of personal
jurisdiction could be raised in contempt proceedings, as could arguments that an alleged contemnor was
an "intermediary bank" excluded from the injunction).
43.
The court also rejected arguments that the injunction was contrary to the public
interest, asserting that "Argentina has been a uniquely recalcitrant debtor," id. at *10, and that the case
had little significance as a precedent. We do not dwell on this conclusion here, although we think it rests
more on wishful thinking than on any coherent, administrable distinction between Argentina and other
sovereign debtors. As just one example, the court interpreted Argentina's paripassu clause to allow the
country to refuse to pay holdouts, but not when the refusal amounted to "extraordinary behavior." Id
Even if we knew the difference between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" selective non-payment, it is not
clear to us why the difference would matter to investors.
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Argentina can be credibly prevented from paying the exchange bondholders.
Thus, the injunction prevents Bank of New York Mellon, the trustee under
exchange bonds governed by New York law, from passing on any funds it
receives from Argentina.44 The injunction forbids clearing houses and payment
systems to process payments under the exchange bonds or any others Argentina
might issue to circumvent the injunction. It specifically names entities located
in Belgium, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom as potentially subject to
sanction.45 And it prevents Argentina's legal and financial advisers from
helping the country devise a payment method that does not involve the enjoined
financial intermediaries.46 Thus, the injunction enlists much of the global
financial system in the court's effort to make Argentina pay and holds the
exchange bondholders hostage to Argentina's unwillingness to pay NML in
full. 47
In other work, we each have expressed reservations about the injunction
and the interpretation of the paripassu clause adopted by the district court and
the Second Circuit.48 We do not repeat those arguments here, nor do we
speculate on the ultimate outcome of the case, or the as-yet uncertain
consequences of NML for future debt restructurings. The injunction merits
special attention at this stage, because NML makes clear already that injunctive
relief can be an unusually potent weapon in a creditor's fight against a foreign
sovereign.

44.
For holders of bonds governed by New York law, Argentina initiates the payment
process by transferring funds to Bank of New York Mellon, the indenture trustee. See NML Capital, Ltd.
v. Republic of Argentina, 2012 WL 5895786, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012). If the injunction extends
to it, Bank of New York Mellon cannot forward the funds without risking contempt sanctions.
Argentina, moreover, cannot unilaterally change this payment mechanism.
45.
See supra note 36.
46.
For possible payment scenarios and the risks they pose to payment system
participants and other intermediaries, see Vladimir Werning, Argentina: Fade the Price Rebound
Following
the
Court's
"RSVP"
Order
to
Holdouts,
J.P.
MORGAN,
http://markets.jpmorgan.com/researchlEmailPubServlet?action=open&hashcode-htol qfg&doc=GPS-1
090512-0.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
47.
NML and the courts have strenuously resisted this characterization, suggesting
variously that Argentina is responsible for the exchange bondholders' plight and that the bondholders
knowingly took the risk of a "hostage" injunction by lending to a debtor with Argentina's pari passu
clause. This strikes us as a matter of semantics: the plaintiffs designed and the courts sanctioned a
remedy that hinges on a credible threat of dramatic losses to the exchange bondholders and massive
economic dislocation in Argentina. No threat, no remedy. Who pulls the trigger in the end is secondary.
As we note below, moreover, the argument is puzzling after the courts refused to allow NML to stop the
exchange from happening in the first place, precisely out of concern for "the economic health of a
nation." See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
48.
See Gelpern, supra note 8; Weidemaier, supra note 16; Weidemaier & McCarl,
supra note 7; Anna Gelpern, Sovereign Damage Control, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON., May 2013,
http://www.piie.com/publications/pb/pbl3-12.pdf.
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II. The Incomplete Case Against Injunctions
Injunctions are equitable remedies, to be granted only when the plaintiff
has no adequate remedy at law and only when the remedy is, broadly speaking,
consistent with the equitable exercise of the court's power. 49 The judge must
"consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the
requested relief' 50 and also take into account the extent to which an injunction
would serve or undermine the public interest:
The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do
equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case.
Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and
practicality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and
reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as well as between
competing private claims. 51
Whether an injunction can be reconciled with the public interest depends
primarily on the extent to which the injunction benefits or harms third parties. 52
"Specific relief sometimes costs more than it is worth";s3 the costs are
especially apparent when they fall on third parties that derive no benefit from
the remedy.
Additional considerations come into play when the party to be enjoined is
a foreign sovereign entitled to immunity under the FSIA.54 In the following
discussion, we assume with the courts that the FSIA does not categorically
forbid injunctions, a conclusion buttressed by some of the statute's legislative
history.55 We also avoid some complexities unique to the NML injunction, such

49.
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-13 (1982).
50. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987).
51.
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944); see also City of Harrisonville v.
W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 338 (1933) ("Where an important public interest would be
prejudiced, the reasons for denying the injunction may be compelling.").
52.
Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1986).
53.
Douglas Laycock, The Death of the IrreparableInjury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REv.
687, 749 (1990).
54. Similar considerations might apply in other contexts, including injunctions by
federal courts against government actors in U.S. states. See, e.g., Hoover v. Wagner, 47 F.3d 845, 850
(7th Cir. 1995) (referencing comity as a basis for refusing to enjoin state and local public officials).
55.
28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2012) provides, with exceptions not relevant here: "As to any
claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not entitled to immunity . . .the foreign state shall
be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances."
Explaining this section, the relevant House Report noted that, "a court could, when circumstances were
clearly appropriate, order an injunction or specific performance." H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6621
(1976). This does not necessarily mean that courts can impose meaningful penalties for violation of such
an order. See id (continuing that "this is not determinative of the power of the court to enforce such an
order. For example, a foreign diplomat or official could not be imprisoned for contempt .... Also a fine
for violation of an injunction may be unenforceable if immunity [from attachment and execution]
exists").
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as whether it amounts to a disguised (and prohibited) attachment of immune
assets. 56 We focus instead on the dominant policy objections to national courts
enjoining foreign sovereigns.
A. The Comity Objection
Requests for injunctive relief are commonly met with the objection that
such remedies impair comity, the "elusive doctrine . . . which attempts to

mediate the frictions inherent in a community of sovereign states."57 It is not
hard to see why. The "community of sovereign states" is a community of
equals. It is rather presumptuous for a national court of one sovereign to
attempt to dictate the behavior of another,58 especially when the behavior takes
place in the enjoined sovereign's own territory.59 To take an extreme example,
a plaintiff might request an injunction that interferes with a foreign sovereign's
ability to conduct energy policy, such as an injunction against the construction
of a nuclear power plant. Whatever its legal merits, an injunction of this
nature would prompt outrage and defiance from the enjoined government. By

56.
See supra note 6; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19-27, Republic of
Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., Ill S. Ct. 1855 (June 24, 2013) (No. 12-842); Brief for the United
States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Republic of Argentina's Petition for Panel
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 1, No. 12-105-cv(L) (2d Cir. Dec. 28, 2012).
57.
Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 75 (3d Cir. 1994);
Hoover v. Wagner, 47 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating, in rejecting request for federal injunction
against state and local officials, that "[e]quitable remedies are powerful ... and when . . . they are
sought to be applied to officials of one sovereign by the courts of another, they can impair comity").
Similar concerns can arise in litigation between private parties. Most notably, courts take into
account considerations of comity when deciding whether to enjoin litigation in foreign courts. See, e.g.,
Karaha Bodas Co., LLC. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 500 F.3d 111,
120-27 (2d Cir. 2007) (affirming antisuit injunction against state-owned entity only after concluding that
"comity concerns do not weigh against entry of an anti-suit injunction"); Quaak v. Klynveld Peat
Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2004) (adopting the "conservative
approach," which questions "whether the foreign action either imperils the jurisdiction of the forum
court or threatens some strong national policy" and "accords appreciably greater weight to
considerations of international comity"); General Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 161 (3d Cir.
2001) (agreeing with the "restrictive" approach in which courts enjoin foreign litigation "only to protect
jurisdiction or an important public policy"). The concerns are only heightened when the injunction runs
against a sovereign or its officials. See Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 432
(7th Cir. 1993) (comparing conservative and "laxer" injunction standards and noting that, if plaintiff
"were seeking an order that would run against a [French] official or agency . . . there would be no need
for evidence that the antisuit injunction would ruffle the smooth surface of our relations with France").
58.
See Michael D. Ramsey, Acts of State and Foreign Sovereign Obligations, 39
HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 94 (1998) (noting the "serious issues of sovereign offense that would be raised" by
an injunction against a foreign government, although speculating that "these claims are unlikely to be
directly pursued or seriously contemplated in the context of international investment").
59.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d at 79 n.18 (noting that even when a foreign
sovereign has subjected itself to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, it does not "give[] up its essential
attributes of sovereignty, including in particular its authority to administer in its sole discretion its own
laws respecting its own citizens within its own territory").
60.
See Superior Provincial Court (Oberlandesgericht) of Linz, Decision of Mar. 2,
1989, Nuclear Power Plant Injunction Case (No. 2), 86 ILR 578 (Austria).
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cautioning against unwarranted intrusion into a foreign sovereign's affairs,
61
notions of comity help to mitigate "the risks of intersovereign conflict."
These risks are heightened if an injunction requires extended judicial
supervision or management of the foreign sovereign's affairs. Even in litigation
between private parties, courts hesitate to issue injunctions that require
extensive or extended supervision of the defendant.62 The hesitancy may reflect
a mix of doubts as to judicial competency and concerns over the efficient use of
scarce judicial resources.63 In the sovereign context, supervisory injunctions
have additional and serious implications for comity, as they purport to
constitute U.S. courts as "ad hoc regulatory agenc[ies]" with jurisdiction over
foreign governments.64
In Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., for
example, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated an injunction
directing the Philippines to stop harassing witnesses who had testified against it
and to "renounce and abandon" retaliatory legal and disciplinary proceedings
underway in the Philippines. Despite upholding the district court's finding
that the Republic had engaged in harassment, the Court of Appeals deemed the
injunction an unprecedented intrusion in "the internal law enforcement
activities of a foreign sovereign." 66 As the court read the injunction, it
instructed the Republic to grant two witnesses "immunity from prosecution for
past tax law violations" and might require the district judge to examine the
government's motive if any witness in the Philippines "received a traffic

Peter B. Rutledge, Toward a Functional Approach to Sovereign Equality, 53 VA. J.
61.
INT'L L. 181, 184-85 (2012). Similar considerations animate the Act of State doctrine, as does the
concern that courts might "encroach upon the executive branch's constitutional responsibility to conduct
foreign relations." Paul B. Stephan III, InternationalLaw in the Supreme Court, 1990 SUP. CT. REV.
133, 138. The Act of State defense, however, is unavailable when the sovereign has agreed to pay its
debts in the United States. See Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d
Cir. 1985).
62. See 1 IA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2942 (2d ed. 1995); see, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 161-66 (1948)
(vacating injunction that would not be effective unless the courts became involved "heavily in the details
of business management"); In re Diet Drugs Products Liability Litig., 369 F.3d 293, 315 (3d Cir. 2004)
(noting that "injunctions must be enforceable, workable, and capable of court supervision"); Walgreen
Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Many injunctions require continuing
supervision by the court, and that is costly.").
See, e.g., Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies,
63.
Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir. 1992) (asserting that supervisory injunctions "can be a drain on scarce
judicial resources" and that courts hesitate to issue "injunctions that constitute the issuing court an ad
hoc regulatory agency to supervise the activities of the parties"). Compare with the Restatement of
Contracts, which counsels against specific enforcement of promises where it would "impose on the court
burdens in enforcement or supervision that are disproportionate to the advantages to be gained from
enforcement and the harm to be suffered from its denial." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
366 (1981).
Chocolate Chip Cookie, 970 F.2d at 277 (referring to the general hesitancy to issue
64.
supervisory injunctions in the non-sovereign context).
Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 78 (3d Cir. 1994).
65.
Id. at 79.
66.
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citation, or was involved in a tax fraud investigation, or had any other scrape
with the law." 67 Principles of international comity prevented U.S. courts from
undertaking extensive supervision of such core government functions as law
enforcement.
B. The Comity Shortfall
We are convinced by the comity objection inasmuch as injunctions against
foreign sovereigns can complicate relations between governments or undermine
international institutions or governance regimes. When a court order would
create a foreign affairs problem, for example, judges appropriately tend to hold
back so as not to intrude on the domain of actors in the political branches.6 9 But
not all injunctions against sovereigns raise these concerns.70
The injunction in NML, for example, restricts Argentina's use of foreign
exchange reserves and imposes conditions on the country's decisions with
respect to debt service. Few countries would welcome the intrusion of foreign
courts into these matters.71 Other considerations, however, suggest that the
injunction implicates principles of comity to a lesser degree. The injunction
purports only to enforce a promise made by Argentina. Such an order seems
less likely to offend sovereign dignity and disrupt international relations than
one imposing obligations that the sovereign did not assume voluntarily. 72 The
injunction does not require particularly intrusive supervision by U.S. courts: it
is easy to figure out whether Argentina has paid NML as required; similarly, a

67.
Id. at 78.
68.
Id. at 75-79.
69.
Thus, in the Allied Bank decisions (which involved claims for money damages
rather than injunctive relief against a sovereign debtor), the Second Circuit's application of comity
principles changed in accordance with its understanding of the U.S. government's international debt
restructuring policy. See Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.
1985).
70.
Lawsuits that do not involve claims for injunctive relief can have serious comity
implications, although these are not treated as categorical bars to relief Courts applying forum non
conveniens doctrine, for example, might publicly declare that a foreign judicial system is too corrupt to
fairly resolve a dispute. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1085 (S.D. Fla.
1997) (refusing to dismiss onforum non conveniens grounds after overcoming "[w]hatever inhibitions
the Court may feel about declaring the Bolivian justice system too corrupt to permit fair adjudication of
plaintiffs' claims"). Such cases are rare, but the inquiry itself can ruffle sovereign feathers. See GARY B.
BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 439-40

(2011) (describing forum non conveniens cases and querying the propriety of U.S. courts passing
judgment on foreign judicial systems); see also Rutledge, supranote 61, at 185-91 (reviewing doctrines
that require courts to evaluate the conduct or institutions of foreign sovereigns).
71.
Cf Ramsey, supra note 58, at 82 (noting the "political sensitivity" of enforcement
litigation with respect to a country's external debt).
72.
This is not to say that Argentina knowingly assumed the obligations imposed by the
paripassu clause as interpreted by the district court and Second Circuit. Again, we disagree with that
interpretation but do not repeat our objections here. See supra note 43. Nevertheless, the issuance of
bonds was a voluntary act, and the bonds explicitly allow bondholders to ask New York courts to
resolve disagreements about Argentina's obligations.
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payment to the exchange bondholders will not go unnoticed. Judges sitting in
New York need not peer inside Argentina's borders to know whether their
orders have been obeyed.
Moreover, Argentina seems to have gone out of its way to subject itself to
the will of New York courts. It agreed to pay its debts in New York, in U.S.
currency. It expansively waived sovereign immunity, expressly submitted to
the jurisdiction of the very federal courts whose orders it has since vowed to
ignore, and consented "to the giving of any relief or the issue of any process" to
enforce the debt.73 All of these factors support NML's characterization of the
transaction as one in which Argentina voluntarily ceded many of the sovereign
prerogatives it might reasonably expect in a wholly domestic matter. 74
Nor is the injunction sure to cause new diplomatic troubles between the
United States and Argentina. Although the U.S. government has intervened on
Argentina's side in this and related cases, it has expressed relatively muted
concerns about comity. Three-quarters into its first amicus brief, the United
States observes that the injunction "is particularly likely to raise foreign
relations tensions." 75 The same brief opens with apparent dismay at Argentina's
"failure to honor its obligations or to engage with international institutions."76
Beyond its statements in NML, the United States has withdrawn bilateral trade
benefits and supported sanctions against Argentina at the International
Monetary Fund.

73.
See Form of Registered Security, at A-17 to A-18, attached to the Fiscal Agency
Agreement between the Republic of Argentina and Bankers Trust Company (Oct. 19, 1994).
74. See Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 521-22 (applying act of state doctrine); see also
Ramsey, supra note 58 at 82 ("[O]nce the foreign sovereign has agreed to the role of the United States
court and to a set of legal principles, the sovereign will not be seriously upset, even in a politically
sensitive matter, if the court fulfills that role and applies those principles."). Professor Ramsey is
discussing lawsuits seeking money judgments and seems to view injunctions in categorically different
terms. Id. at 92, 95. As discussed in the text, we agree that injunctions are more injurious to sovereign
dignity, and more potentially intrusive on executive branch prerogatives, than money judgments, but we
do not see them as categorically different.
75.
Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal at
29, NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. Apr. 4, 2012) (No. 12-105cv(L)); Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Republic of
Argentina's Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 7-8, NAL (No. 12-105-cv(L)).
Compare this to the government's more vocal expression of foreign trade and foreign affairs concerns in
other cases. See, e.g., Brief for the United States Government as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 28-34, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2010) (No. 10-97), 2010
WL 4735597.
76.
Brief of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal at 4,
NML (No. 12-105-cv(L)).
77.
See Tom Barkley & Ken Parks, U.S. Cuts Trade Preferences to Argentina, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 26, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230417710457730565247908518
4.html; Sandrine Rastello & Ian Katz, Argentina is FirstNation Censured by IMFfor Economic Data,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2, 2013, 11:43 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-01/argentina-becom
es-first-nation-censured-by-imf-on-inflation-data.html.
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We do not mean to imply that an inquiry into comity requires only that
domestic courts consider whether an injunction will impair relations with the
state targeted by the injunction. Default on a sovereign's public debt
necessarily implicates the interests of many governments. In the ensuing
litigation, a domestic court's choice of remedy has serious potential
implications for international comity. Before the Second Circuit, the U.S.
government suggested as much by arguing, unsuccessfully, that the NML
injunction could complicate future debt restructurings and imperil timely
repayment of debts to international financial institutions. 79 Our broader point,
instead, is that comity considerations are not dispositive and, indeed, are not
always more serious in cases involving injunctive relief than in cases involving
money judgments.80
C. The Enforcement Objection

Whether or not the case involves a sovereign, courts are reluctant to issue
injunctions when the prospect of compliance is low.81 The classic case is one
where the defendant is not subject to the court's jurisdiction and thus cannot be
enjoined. 82 This includes cases in which a foreign sovereign is immune from
suit under the FSIA.83 Argentina, like most defendants in sovereign debt cases,
has broadly waived its immunity from suit and execution under the FSIA. 84
Even in such cases, however, courts cannot impose meaningful sanctions

78.
In this, the decision about remedies is no different than the choice between
domestic and foreign (or international) law, the decision whether to give extraterritorial effect to
domestic law, or a host of other decisions faced by domestic courts. For an analysis of the global
governance functions performed by domestic courts, see Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and
Global Governance, 84 TUL. L. REv. 67 (2009).
79.
Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal at
17-20, NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. Apr. 4, 2012) (No. 12-105cv(L)).
80.
See infra note 70.
81.
See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 647 (2d Cir. 1956)
(noting that the power to grant an injunction "should be exercised with great reluctance when it will be
difficult to secure compliance with any resulting decree or when the exercise of such power is fraught
with possibilities of discord and conflict with the authorities of another country").
82.
See I IA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 62, § 2945.
83.
In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litig., 94 F.3d 539, 545 (9th Cir.
1996).
84. See Form of Registered Security, supra note 73, at A-18.
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directly against sovereign defendants or their public officials. Foreign
diplomats cannot be jailed if their government defies a court order.86
As we read the cases, U.S. courts can enforce injunctions and other orders
against foreign sovereigns, if at all, only by imposing litigation-related
penalties (such as adverse inferences) or by levying monetary fines that will
87
likely go uncollected. Although we focus on the law in the United States,
courts elsewhere may have even fewer tools to enjoin sovereigns and compel
compliance. These limitations on the court's enforcement power raise the
question of whether courts should enter injunctions against foreign sovereigns
at all.89 In a series of amicus briefs filed in cases involving sovereign litigants,
the U.S. government has implied that the answer is "no." 90

85.
Because it is irrelevant to our main argument, we ignore the distinction between
civil and criminal contempt. See, e.g., Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512
U.S. 821, 823-34 (1994) (discussing the distinction). Thus, we refer to contempt "sanctions," and
occasionally contempt "penalties," without meaning to imply that violation of an injunction necessarily
results in criminal contempt proceedings and without considering whether there might be a difference
between these forms of contempt in the sovereign context.
86.
See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6621 (1976).
87.
The U.S. government has argued that the FSIA does not allow courts to enforce a
monetary fine without an explicit waiver of the sovereign's "immunity from enforcement of punitive,
quasi-criminal sanctions." See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, Af-Cap, Inc. v.
Republic of Congo, 462 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. Mar. 10, 2006) (No. 05-51168). Whatever the legal merit of
this argument, a sovereign defendant may not have attachable U.S. assets that could be seized to collect
the fine. Despite these uncertainties, courts have approved the imposition of fines and other penalties in
response to a sovereign's violation of discovery orders, litigation misconduct, or disregard of a final
order directing the turnover of property. See, e.g., FG Hemisphere Assocs., LLC v. Democratic Republic
of Congo, 637 F.3d 373 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (affirming monetary fine imposed as contempt sanction for
violation of discovery orders, but leaving open the question whether such an order could be enforced);
Autotech Techs. LP v. Integral Research & Dev. Corp., 499 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2007) (reversing
contempt sanction but rejecting argument that federal courts lack contempt power absent an explicit
waiver of immunity from contempt); Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65,
80 (3d Cir. 1994) (reversing injunction against witness intimidation but noting that the court could have
imposed monetary sanctions or dismissed the sovereign's claims); Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling
Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming monetary fine against foreign instrumentality for
failing to comply with discovery orders in aid of execution); Chabad v. Russian Federation, Civil No.
05-1548 (RCL), 2013 WL 164071 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2013) (imposing a monetary fine as contempt
sanction for noncompliance with final order requiring sovereign defendant to turn over religious texts
and artifacts). But see Af-Cap, 462 F.3d at 428-29 (reversing contempt order imposing monetary
sanctions for failure to comply with turnover order, stating that FSIA sections 1610 and 1611 "describe
the available methods of attachment and execution against property of foreign states. Monetary
sanctions are not included").
88.

See HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 618-20 (2008).

See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litig., 94 F.3d 539, 545 (9th
89.
Cir. 1996) ("A court should not issue an unenforceable injunction.").
90.
The U.S. government has typically gotten involved at a somewhat later stage, after
the imposition of monetary sanctions. Often this is because the relevant order involved discovery
matters and, but for the fine, would not have attracted much attention from executive branch officials.
But the argument against monetary sanctions also applies to the decision as to whether to issue an
injunction in the first place. For relevant amicus briefs, see Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellant at 15, FG Hemisphere Assocs. (No. 10-7046) (arguing that the court could not
enforce an award of monetary sanctions, then asserting that a "court should not issue an unenforceable
order against a foreign state" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Brief of the United States as Amicus
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D. The Embargo Alternative

The argument that an injunction cannot be enforced against a foreign
sovereign looks for enforcement in the wrong place, and measures it by the
wrong standard. True, a court cannot impose meaningful penalties on the
sovereign itself.91 But the holder of a money judgment against a sovereign
often faces an analogous barrier: most or all sovereign assets will be immune
from seizure.92 NML is a poster child for this problem, having scoured the
world for attachable assets for over a decade. Nevertheless, it is a mistake to
dismiss a court's order as unenforceable against a sovereign merely because the
court lacks the direct enforcement tools used against non-sovereigns: asset
seizure (in the case of money judgments) and contempt (in the case of
injunctions). The mistake comes from assuming that these direct methods of
enforcement are equally relevant when the defendant is a sovereign. They are
not. Injunctions against sovereigns may be harder to enforce than injunctions
against private parties, but this does not make them unenforceable. In the
sovereign context, they can be more enforceable than money judgments.
When a plaintiff seeks money damages against a foreign sovereign, courts
acknowledge the enforcement difficulty but grant relief anyway. The usual
explanation for this practice is that Congress contemplated cases in which the
FSIA would give a "right without a remedy." 93 It would be more accurate to
say that the FSIA gives plaintiffs few direct remedies against the sovereign or
its assets. 94 But this does not end the enforcement inquiry. When viewed
functionally, money judgments and injunctions are enforced in the same way,
indirectly, by disrupting the sovereign's relations with third parties. We loosely
refer to this disruption as a "court-imposed embargo."
For example, with certain exceptions, the holder of a money judgment
may enforce it by seizing the sovereign's commercial assets in the United

Curiae, Belize Telecom, Ltd. v. Gov't of Belize, No. 05-12641-CC (11th Cir. filed May 4, 2005) (same);
and Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant at 10-11, Af-Cap (No. 0551168) (same). The U.S. government appeared as an amicus i NMLE but focused its arguments on
whether the injunction constituted a disguised attachment of immune assets and (briefly) on comity
considerations. See supranote 75.
91.
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
92.

FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND

LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISES 55-56 (2007); William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign
Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 11 (2004).
93.
De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 798 (2d Cir. 1984); see also FG
Hemisphere Assocs., 637 F.3d at 377 ("The FSIA is a rather unusual statute that explicitly contemplates
that a court may have jurisdiction over an action against a foreign state and yet be unable to enforce its
judgment unless the foreign state holds certain kinds of property subject to execution."); Af-Cap, 462
F.3d at 429 ("The FSIA Allows Rights Without Remedies.").
94.
Given the size of the claims involved, this is true in essentially all sovereign debt
cases. As noted, NML has seized very little in the way of actual sovereign assets. See supranotes 24-28
and accompanying text. It is unlikely to seize enough even to keep pace with the accrual of postjudgment interest on its claims.
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States. 95 In practice, sovereigns often move these assets out of the reach of U.S.
courts.96 Likewise, sovereigns keep assets away from jurisdictions where a
creditor might seek to have the judgment recognized and enforced. 97
The need to protect assets impedes the sovereign's trade and other
relations with third parties. The government may have to forego transactions
that pose a substantial risk of asset seizure. One example is the purchase of
commercial goods from a U.S. seller. Officials can attempt to conduct such
transactions through state-owned or controlled enterprises, but this too imposes
costs and does not eliminate the risk of seizure. 99 Even if the government is
willing to take the risk, money judgments impose costs on third parties (not
least the cost of complying with or fighting asset seizures) that may lead them
to refuse to deal with the sovereign or to charge it a premium.100 The effect is
that the sovereign must conduct external transactions in roundabout, less
efficient ways, if it can conduct them at all.
If the costs imposed by this embargo exceed the benefits of
noncompliance, a rational sovereign will pay the judgment. This description is
illustrative; we do not intend it as a formal or complete model of the
sovereign's compliance decision. For example, compliance with a foreign
court's order may entail positive or negative domestic political consequences

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1610-1611 (2012).
95.
If the sovereign has not waived immunity from execution-and not all do, see
96.
Weidemaier, supra note 1, at 25-28-it may not have to remove assets from the United States. As
relevant here, without such a waiver, a creditor can seize a sovereign's U.S. commercial assets only if
"used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is based" (i.e., in the sovereign debt context,
"used for" borrowing money). 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (2012). It is not clear that any assets will meet this
description. A risk-averse sovereign, however, will not take the risk.
For discussion of practices concerning recognition and enforcement of U.S.
97.
judgments abroad, see BORN & RUTLEDGE, supranote 70, at 184-86; and Samuel P. Baumgartner, How
Well Do U.S. Judgments Fare in Europe?, 40 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 173 (2008).
See STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 92, at 33-34; Bulow & Rogoff,
98.
supranote 26, at 158-59; Gersovitz, supranote 26, at 1-3.
99.
See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 629-30 (1983) (state instrumentalities and state-owned entities are treated as legally separate,
except when "so extensively controlled ... that a relationship of principal and agent is created" or when
separate treatment "would work fraud or injustice"); see also EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 2009
WL 2568433, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2009), aff'd, 389 F. App'x 38 (2d Cir. August 3, 2010),
(confirming prejudgment attachment orders against funds held in trust after concluding that trusts were
not entitled to protection as legally separate entities).
100.
In extreme cases, for example, a third party might find itself on the hook for
satisfying some or all of the plaintiffs claim. This might happen, for example, to a party that holds nonimmune sovereign assets and does not turn them over in response to a garnishment order. See, e.g., N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 5225 & 5227 (McKinney 2012). Third parties who do business with the sovereign also can
expect to find themselves on the receiving end of discovery requests and other judicial process-backed,
as is an injunction, by the court's contempt authority-designed to ferret out where the sovereign keeps
its assets. See, e.g., EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2012).
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for public officials quite apart from the immediate economic cost of the
embargo. lot

An injunction has a similar effect. It binds the enjoined party and also
certain third parties with actual notice of the injunction, including the enjoined
party's "officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys" and others who
act "in active concert or participation" with an enjoined person.102 The purpose
of extending the reach of the injunction to third parties is to ensure that the
enjoined party does not "nullify a decree by carrying out prohibited acts
through aiders and abettors." 1 03 In most cases, the court may impose contempt
penalties on the party who disobeys an injunction and on third parties who
knowingly assist in the violation.
When the enjoined party is a sovereign, the risk of contempt falls mainly
on third parties. Thus, Argentina cannot be penalized directly for violating the
NML injunction, but anyone who is part of the payment chain between
Argentina and the exchange bondholders is at risk of being deemed "in active
concert or participation" and held in contempt. As noted, this includes the
bondholders' trustee, payment systems and clearing house operators. 105
Money judgments can disrupt a wider range of relationships between the
sovereign and third parties. If courts in the relevant jurisdiction will enforce the
judgment, any person who holds the sovereign's assets or owes the sovereign
money can become embroiled in proceedings to enforce a money judgment. 106
By contrast, to risk contempt sanctions, a third party "must either abet the
defendant, or must be legally identified with him," in a violation of the
injunction.107 The risk of contempt sanctions, however, will make affected third
parties hesitant to deal with a sovereign. As with a money judgment, the
resulting disruption may induce the sovereign to comply.
The primary difference between injunctions and money judgments is that
they impair different transactions between the sovereign and third parties. For

101.
Noncompliance also may yield political as well as economic benefits. See, e.g.,
CristinaKirchner Triumphant as Seized Argentine Tall Ship Returns Home, TELEGRAPH (LON.), Jan. 10,
2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/argentina/9792483/Cristina-Kirchner-t
riumphant-as-seized-Argentine-tall-ship-retums-home.html. We do not mean to suggest that this courtimposed embargo is the only reason to comply. For example, a sovereign might honor a court judgment
to avoid injury to its reputation and to preserve its ability to engage in future transactions (i.e.,
transactions unaffected by the embargo). Again, however, this supports the point that injunctions need
not be less enforceable than money judgments. Surely a sovereign that defies a direct court order suffers
no less reputational harm than one that refuses to pay a money judgment.
102.
FED. R. CIv. P. 65(d)(2).
103.
Regal Knitwear Co. v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 9, 13 (1945).
104.
Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 833 (2d Cir. 1930) (defining court's
contempt power as extending to third parties who "either abet the defendant, or [are] . . . legally
identified with him").
105.
See supra note 36 for the relevant text of the injunction.
106.
See supranote 104 and accompanying text.
107.
Alemite Mfg., 42 F.2d at 833.
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creditors, these are features rather than bugs, and they may lead to the
conclusion that a sovereign is more likely to comply with an injunction. NML v.
Argentina illustrates the point. The outstanding money judgments against
Argentina commit it to a constant stream of legal fees and evasive maneuvers
to accomplish the most basic external diplomatic, military, and commercial
objectives. The judgments also prevent it from borrowing money in major
financial markets. So far, however, Argentina has been willing to pay the price
of its partial isolation, including the higher borrowing costs in domestic capital
markets, attorneys' fees in far-flung jurisdictions, and airplane chartering fees
for its president.1os The NML injunction does nothing to prevent Argentina
from borrowing money or from engaging in commercial transactions. On the
other hand, the injunction impairs Argentina's ability to service its existing
debt.'0 This may prove more costly, and, if so, it could tip the calculus in favor
of compliance.
The dynamic we have described is not unique to sovereign debt litigation
in national courts. Court judgments impose similar embargos on private
defendants,o10 although asset seizure and the threat of contempt play a much
larger role when sovereignty is not a factor." ' Likewise, it is well-recognized
that international legal regimes sometimes enforce their rules through similar
embargos.112 Whatever the context, a remedy might be justified
notwithstanding the burdens it imposes on third parties." 3 Then again, it might
not.

108.
See The "ARA Libertad Case" (Argentina v. Ghana), Case No. 20, Order of Dec.
15, 2012, ITLOS, http://www.itios.org/fileadmin/itilos/documents/cases/case no.20/C20_Order15_122
012.pdf; Fontevecchia, supranote 27. In other cases, the costs imposed by a money judgment may prove
more substantial. For example, Peru and Congo settled soon after the courts ruled against them. See
Jonathan I. Blackman & Rahul Mukhi, The Evolution of Modern Sovereign Debt Litigation: Vultures,
Alter Egos, and Other Legal Fauna, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 56 (2010) (explaining Congo's
settlement); Michael Bradley et al., The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and Their Antidotes: Lessons
from the Sovereign Debt Market, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 290 (2010) (explaining Peru's settlement).
109.
The money judgments do not have this effect, because money passing through
New York to exchange bondholders belongs to them.
110.
See Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and
InternationalLaw, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 259 (2011) ("A dominant mode of enforcement in domestic legal
systems for the past two millennia-and one still actively in use in our own federal system today-has
involved various forms of externalization and outcasting. The law has routinely used private parties to
exile, excommunicate, outlaw, pillory, and shun those who break the rules.").
111.
This is true even though private defendants often have the tools to render
themselves judgment-proof. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death ofLiability, 106 YALE L.J. I (1996).
112.
Cf Warren F. Schwartz & Alan 0. Sykes, The Economic Structure of
Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S 179-S 180
(2002) ("The treaty creating the [WTO] replaced the [GATT] dispute resolution system ... with a
system that results in centrally authorized sanctions against recalcitrant violators of WTO trade
policy.").
113.
See, e.g., Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 110, at 271-72 (describing secondary
rules as those that "require or permit others to act in ways deemed costly to the conduct rule violator or
not to act in ways deemed beneficial"); Eric A. Posner & Alan 0. Sykes, Efficient Breach of
InternationalLaw: Optimal Remedies, "Legalized Noncompliance," and Related Issues, 110 MICH. L.
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III. The Perils of Injunctions, Revisited
Although we have argued that comity-based objections can be overstated
and that enforcement-based objections are misdirected, there are inevitable
problems with the issuance of injunctions against foreign sovereigns. The
comity and enforcement objections compare injunctions against private
litigants to injunctions against sovereigns, inevitably finding problems with the
latter. As a matter of fact, getting redress of any kind from sovereigns remains a
hard and uncertain business, restrictive immunity notwithstanding. Whatever
remedy the plaintiff seeks, the process also will ruffle sovereign feathers and
threaten to unsettle diplomatic relations. But in the sovereign context, concerns
over comity and enforceability do not support radically different approaches to
money judgments and injunctions.
Nevertheless, we remain convinced that injunctions against sovereigns
present distinct and more serious problems. This is true whether we compare
them to money judgments against sovereigns or to injunctions against private
parties. First, courts arguably have more riding on compliance with injunctions
than with money judgments. This holds true whether or not the case involves a
sovereign. Second, courts will make noncompliance more costly than
compliance for sovereigns primarily by way of the embargo described in Part
II.114

NML offers a stark illustration of this dynamic. The district court issued
the injunction for the express purpose of giving the plaintiffs "leverage" against
an intransigent debtor that had consistently evaded efforts to enforce money
judgments.'15 But as the plaintiffs and the courts sought to raise the stakes, they
ran up against two inconvenient facts. First, Argentina did not intend to comply
with any injunction.116 Second, Argentina could defy an order without fear of
direct penalty. Any hope of compliance, then, rested on the injunction's effect
on third parties.117 Acknowledging that it was necessary to show that "our

REv. 243, 274 (2011) (referring to countermeasures under international law and noting that,
"unfortunately, the only available retaliation may entail substantial collateral costs, yet may be
preferable to inaction"); Alan 0. Sykes, Public Versus PrivateEnforcement of InternationalEconomic
Law: Standing andRemedy, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 631 (2005) (noting deadweight costs of trade sanctions).
Again, we recognize there may be other costs to noncompliance, such as concerns
114.
for the reputational consequences of noncompliance. See supra note 101.
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of
115.
Argentina (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012) (No. 03 Civ. 8845 (TPG)); Transcript of Oral Argument at 40,
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011) (No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG)).
116.
As one Second Circuit judge would eventually summarize Argentina's position,
"[D]espite the district court's order, and despite the possibility that we might affirm it, [Argentina]
would not obey any order, other than the one you've just proposed." Transcript of Oral Argument at 1415, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d. Cir Feb. 27, 2013) (No. 12-105CV(L)).
NML's counsel candidly acknowledged as much during the second oral argument
117.
before the Second Circuit:
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courts are not helpless,"11s the district judge named a long list of third parties in
multiple jurisdictions as subject to potential contempt sanctions if Argentina
pays exchange bondholders without paying NML.l"9
Argentina and NML are each exceptional in their own way; few debtors or
creditors have the stomach for a decade-long chase. Nevertheless, the case
illustrates a broader structural problem with injunctions against foreign
sovereigns. In the battle for compliance, courts have every reason to impose
dramatic spillover effects on third parties.
A. The Stakes of Compliance

We begin by noting that injunctions may involve higher stakes for the
court.120 A plaintiff who has won a money judgment may use judicial and other
government resources in an effort to collect from the defendant, but these
government actors have a limited reputational stake in the success of the effort.
If the cash till is empty when the sheriff comes to levy, neither the court nor the
sheriff is embarrassed; collection is ultimately the plaintiffs problem. Thus,
although money judgments often go unenforced, this does not seriously call
into question the legitimacy or credibility of courts. By contrast, defiance of an
injunction is a direct challenge to the court's authority-contempt of court. A
court that issues an injunction inserts itself into the relationship between the
litigants, raising the stakes on compliance. Whether or not the case involves a

THE COURT: So but we're really here hearing is that this is an injunction that's sought
so that you can then seek to perhaps get relief from banks or entities in the United States
that you would charge with facilitating the contempt?
MR. OLSON: Yes. If we can prove that, ....
THE COURT: [Interposing] You know, I'm not sure that courts enter injunctions
primarily for the purpose of taking action against such third parties.... [A]m I hearing
you correctly that there is no remedy against Argentina for its own contempt beyond
being labeled a contemnor?
MR. OLSON [after suggesting that noncompliance might harm Argentina's reputation]:
The fact that Argentina would hold itself deliberately in contempt of a United States
court order would have significance and consequences. We expect and Argentina has
said that it would comply. . . .However, my caveat to that is that Argentina has tried
everything possible.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 56-57, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d.
Cir July 23, 2012) (No. 12-105-CV(L)).
118.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 14-15, NML (No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG)).
119.
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 2012 WL 5895786, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 21, 2012).
120.
The consequences for the courts of granting remedies against immune sovereigns
have preoccupied judges and scholars for some time. In the domestic context, sovereign immunity has
even been interpreted as a court-protective doctrine, saving judges the embarrassment of issuing orders
that would be ignored. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty,
Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 521, 608 (2003) (discussing the
history of, and arguing against, immunity as court-protection). We do not need to go this far because in
our view, elaborated in Part II, both money judgments and injunctions against sovereigns are in fact both
potentially enforceable, albeit indirectly.
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sovereign, judges may hesitate to take such gambles.121 This understandable
caution underlies the rule that courts should grant injunctions "with great
reluctance when it will be difficult to secure compliance with any resulting
decree."1 22
Our argument does not depend on the claim that defiance of an injunction
imposes a greater reputational harm on the court. Even if this is not so, the
court will presumably want to secure compliance with its decree. When the
case involves a sovereign, the court will usually understand that the prospect of
compliance is low. This is especially true when the injunction seeks specific
performance of a debt contract covenant (as in the pari passu clause). An
injunction cannot be awarded if money damages will suffice,123 but money
damages will always suffice-if the sovereign will pay them-because the
payment of money is the entire point of a debt contract. Except in extraordinary
(and likely temporary) situations of illiquidity, a money judgment is inadequate
only because the sovereign refuses to pay.124 Calling the remedy an
"injunction" will rarely lead to a change of heart.
For this reason, a court contemplating enjoining a foreign sovereign is
engaged in a metaphorical game of chicken.125 The sovereign is not passive in
this game and can take steps to make threats of defiance credible. To wit,
Argentina's lawyers have stated in open court that the country will not
comply,1 26 and its president has publicly vowed never to pay NML.127 Faced
with such defiance, a court has few options other than to try to design an
airtight embargo. This means that to ratchet up the pressure on the sovereign, it
will have to increase the burdens on third parties. Again, NML illustrates the
point.

121.

See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES

§ 2.1,

at 27

(1973) ("[T]he chancellor must take into account practical questions, whether he can enforce any
remedy he grants, since he does not wish to issue a personal command and have it flouted.").
Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 647 (2d Cir. 1956); see also
122.
supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
123.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 359(1)

(1981).

124.
Thus, the district and appellate courts agreed that Argentina's unwillingness to pay
and its ability to put its assets beyond NML's reach make money damages unattainable, and therefore
inadequate. NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 255, 262 (2d Cir. 2012).
See Weidemaier & McCarl, supranote 7, at T 12.41.
125.
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of
126.
Argentina (2d Cir., Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG)) ("Now, all I'm trying to say is that
Argentina has a public policy. It is not going to and cannot prefer [NML]. And so, if that's the
confrontation that the Court seeks through an injunction, that's the Court's decision.").
127.
See, e.g., Argentina to Blast 'Vulture Funds' at the G20 Ministerial Meeting in
Mexico, MERCOPRESS (Nov. 4, 2012, 6:24 AM), http://en.mercopress.com/2012/l1/04/argentina-to-blas
Such public statements may make it
t-vulture-funds-at-the-g20-ministerial-meeting-in-mexico.
politically difficult for political leaders to change course and thus can lend credibility to threats of
defiance.
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B. The Super-Embargo

As a conceptual matter, it may help to distinguish among the third parties
affected by the NML injunction. The first group consists of legal and financial
advisors, payment intermediaries, and other institutions that risk contempt
sanctions if they are found to have assisted Argentina in violating the
injunction.128 These third parties must incur logistics and monitoring costs to
avoid contempt sanctions. For example, financial intermediaries must
determine whether a particular funds transfer represents a payment by
Argentina in violation of the order. If Argentina tries to service the new bonds
without paying $1.4 billion to NML, then any entity that receives and
knowingly passes on the funds from Argentina to the new bondholders is at
risk. 129
Every injunction imposes costs of this nature; that is the design of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 65.130 But this injunction is remarkable in scope. Some
of the institutions listed by name in the amended injunction as potentially "in
active concert and participation" with Argentina have been designated as
systemically important financial market utilities under Title VIII of the DoddFrank Act; the general reference to payment and clearing systems captures
most of the rest.131 As one U.S. utility points out, the injunction for the benefit
of NML would require participating banks to deploy elaborate systems of the
sort used to implement federal antiterrorism sanctions, and could interfere with
netting and settlement finality, expressly protected by federal statutes.132 Such
costs and risks may be justified by the imperative of fighting terrorism and drug
trading, as expressed in statutes such as the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act and the mandates of implementing agencies, such as the Office of
Foreign Assets Control. It hardly follows that market utilities are to be
commandeered for ordinary debt collection by private plaintiffs.
Moreover, many of the named institutions are located outside the United
States and have raised jurisdiction, conflicts of laws, and comity concerns. For
example, the injunction names Euroclear as potentially subject to sanctions
despite Belgian law that on its face appears to immunize it from court orders

128.
An injunction binds not only the litigants but also third parties with actual notice
of the injunction, including parties who act "in active concert or participation" with a litigant in violating
the order. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2).
129.
See supranote 36 for relevant text of the Injunction of Feb. 23, 2012.
130.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2).
131.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
§§ 805-806, 810 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5464-5465, 5469 (2012)).
132.
Brief for The Clearing House Association L.L.C. Supporting Appellant as Amicus
Curiae at 19-22, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. Jan. 4, 2013) (No. 12-105cv(L)) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 4405 (2012) (protecting netting, among other provisions)).
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like the one in NAM.1 33 Absent public consensus to the contrary, preferably
expressed in legislation, courts should hesitate to burden systemically important
market utilities with the risk of contempt sanctions to enforce ordinary private
debts.134 This concern is even more pronounced when it comes to foreign
institutions governed by foreign law that rejects this very remedy.
Because of its extraterritorial reach, the NAM injunction also implicates
the interests of foreign governments that have decided to shield financial
intermediaries from creditors' efforts to recover debts. The injunction purports
to regulate the conduct of Euroclear despite Belgian legislation enacted
precisely to insulate Euroclear from injunctions of this sort.135 To be sure, U.S.
courts do have the power to enjoin conduct that occurs in foreign territory. For
example, a court may enjoin a party from pursuing litigation in foreign
courts.136 Likewise, it is not uncommon for litigants to target private parties in
an effort to influence the behavior of foreign governments and government
institutions.137 In such cases, however, courts have some obligation to take the
interests of the foreign government seriously. In NM, by contrast, neither the
district court nor the court of appeals made any effort to explain why the
interest in obtaining relief for NML trumped foreign government policies
designed to protect financial intermediaries.
To the contrary, the court of
appeals dodged such questions on procedural grounds even though the practical

133.
The Belgian law was enacted in 2005, in response to an earlier set of sovereign
debt injunctions entered by courts in Belgium. For Euroclear's argument, see Letter for Euroclear Bank
SA/NV as Amicus Curiae, NML (2d Cir. Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.shearman.com/-/media/Files/Old%2
OSite%2OFiles/NMLCapitalvArgentina201314ProposedEuroclearLetter.pdf
(last accessed Feb. 14,
2014). It does not matter whether the injunction's extraterritorial ambition is a fatal legal flaw. See Brief
of Plaintiffs-Appellants Aurelius Capital Master, Ltd. et al. at 32-36, NML (2d Cir. Jan. 25, 2013) (No.
12-105-cv(L)) (responding to arguments made by Euroclear).
134.
See, e.g., Comm. on Payment and Settlement Sys., Principles for Financial
Market
Infrastructures, BANK
FOR
INT'L
SETTrLEMENTS
11
(Apr.
2012),
http://www.bis.org/publ/cpssl01a.pdf, MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41529,
SUPERVISION OF U.S. PAYMENT, CLEARING, AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS: DESIGNATION OF FINANCIAL
MARKET UTILITIES (FMUS) 9-12 (2012).
135.
See Olivares-Caminal, supra note 16, at 52-53. The injunction also arguably
conflicts with the result reached in a similar case in the United Kingdom. See Kensington Int'l Ltd. v.
Republic of Congo, [2003] EWHC (Comm) 2331 [96] (Apr. 16, 2003) (Eng.) (rejecting an NML-style
injunction: "I do not regard it as an appropriate exercise of my discretion . . . to make an order
compliance with which can only realistically be achieved by coercion of third parties. I view with
disquiet ... a situation in which third parties are potentially exposed to penal consequences which could
never be visited upon the defendant to whom the order is actually directed").
136.
See supranote 57.
137.
For example, antisuit injunctions seek to influence the behavior of foreign courts,
and lawsuits under the Alien Tort Statute target private commercial actors in an effort to influence the
behavior of foreign governments. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659
(2013).
138.
As noted, the district court's reasoning was simple: the injunction needed
extraterritorial scope in order to force Argentina to comply. The court of appeals embraced this
reasoning and also declined to address the merits of the arguments raised by foreign entities. See supra
notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
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effect of its decision is that third parties will likely comply without having ever
these arguments considered.139
In addition to legal and financial intermediaries and foreign governments,
the injunction burdens a third group of non-parties. This group includes
exchange bondholders, residents of Argentina, and others who will suffer if the
court, having miscalculated in its game of chicken, fails to induce Argentina to
pay NML. Recall that Argentina has two methods of compliance: pay everyone
in full, or default on everyone "ratably."1 40 If Argentina pays NML the $1.4
billion it owes them, no one will be hurt, although its decision may validate
NML's litigation strategy and complicate future restructurings. If it defaults,
the pain will be felt by the holders of over $50 billion in its new bonds and by
its residents (the latter on the reasonable assumption that defaulting on a large
subset of public debt would harm "the economic health of a nation").141
If Argentina chooses default, the proximate cause of the pain will be
actions by its political leadership.142 But it is not a stretch to say that the
injunction exploits the dramatic cost of default. Indeed, the injunction
transparently seeks to make default a condition of Argentina's unwillingness to
pay NML.143 In effect, the injunction puts a $50 billion price tag on Argentina's
policy against paying holdouts; the $50 billion is other people's money. We do
not think such an injunction can be justified simply by asserting that the courts
are holding Argentina to its promise to pay bondholders in a nondiscriminatory
manner.'4 It is a separate question whether U.S. courts should use their
equitable powers to dare a foreign sovereign's political leadership to commit so
destructive an act.

See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. The district court left little doubt
139.
that it viewed Euroclear as a target for contempt sanctions. The injunction expressly provides that
"Participants shall be bound" and defines the term to include Euroclear. See NML Capital Ltd. v.
Republic of Argentina, Nos. 08 Civ. 06978 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1707 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1708 (TPG) at 5-6
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012). As the court explained its reasoning, to prevent Argentina from defying the
injunction, "it is necessary that the process for making payments on the Exchange Bonds be covered."
Id. at 9. The court further explained that financial intermediaries and clearing systems "surely are 'in
active concert or participation' with Argentina." Id. at 11.
See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
140.
141.
The Second Circuit referenced this concern when it upheld the district court's
refusal to let NML block the 2005 debt exchange. See EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 131 F. App'x
745, 747 (2d Cir. 2005). The exchange offer that the courts refused to block contained a clause in which
Argentina promised that it would never voluntarily pay holdouts more than exchange bondholders were
to receive. That promise squarely contradicts the paripassu clause as the courts interpret it now.
142.
The courts have concluded, albeit without any formal evidence-taking, that
Argentina can pay NML while servicing its existing debt. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of
Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 263 (2d Cir. 2012). Thus, the injunction does not requiredefault.
143.
We express no view on whether the injunction will have its desired effect, whether
Argentina will successfully re-route payments around the United States, or whether its efforts to re-route
payment might themselves constitute a default.
144.
See Amended February 23, 2012 Order, NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of
Argentina, 2012 WL 5895784, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012); NAL, 699 F.3d at 263.
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We doubt that U.S. courts would approve an injunction like this against an
intransigent private debtor. To collect $1.4 billion, the injunction threatens a
breathtaking array of third parties with contempt and challenges Argentine
officials to inflict the pain of default on its people and its creditors, to make
good on their public refusal to pay NML. But the calculus shifts when the case
involves a foreign sovereign. Indeed, injunctions like the one in NML have a
perverse logic given the elevated risk of noncompliance and the lack of direct
enforcement tools. These are injunctions with a hollow core, which cannot
reach their primary targets, and therefore double down on those around them.
With respect to the injunction's scope, it is precisely because sovereigns
can roam the world in search of alternative counterparties and payment
scenarios that courts must reach around the world, sealing every crack and
crevice that could serve as an escape route. Moreover, that sovereign
noncompliance will cause extraordinary harm to third parties actually weighs in
favor of the injunction. It is a reason to call the sovereign's bluff, especially
when the third parties (like lenders and voters) can punish the sovereign's
political leadership. If an injunction is broad and harsh enough to foreclose
low-cost means of defiance, then a court can be reasonably confident that its
order will be obeyed. But if the court guesses wrong, it will lose face and may
be implicated in substantial harm resulting from the foreign sovereign's
defiance.1 45 These risks, distinct from comity and contempt, justify skepticism
about injunctions.
A court considering whether to grant injunctive relief should seriously
weigh the likelihood of compliance and the impact of its efforts to implement
an effective embargo. To date in NML, this has not happened. The various
opinions devote little attention to weighing the public interest factors involved,
and the Second Circuit's recent opinion invokes procedural grounds to dodge
many of the arguments made by foreign parties.146 Cursory references to "the
public interest of enforcing contracts and upholding the rule of law"l 47 cannot
145.
Here, we refer to default as "defiance," even though default is technically
permissible under the injunction. This is because the injunction is transparently designed to force
Argentina to pay. But whichever characterization we choose, the courts will plainly be implicated if
Argentina defaults on some or all of its obligations to exchange bondholders. Argentina may choose its
path, and thereby determine whether and what harm will result from its actions, but the plaintiffs and the
courts meticulously charted all available paths and specified the consequences of taking them.
146.
As noted, the threat of contempt sanctions will likely deter payment system
participants from processing payments to exchange bondholders. See supranotes 42-43. For that reason,
the court's suggestion that third parties will receive a full hearing when they are "summoned to answer"
for alleged contempt rings hollow. As a practical matter, this procedural disposition is little different
from a decision on the merits.
147.
Order at 3, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, Nos. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG),
09 Civ. 1707 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1708 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012). In its two opinions, the Second
Circuit has referenced the public interest standard but has not engaged in much discussion beyond
dismissing Argentina's arguments that the injunction would provoke another debt crisis and interfere
with international debt restructuring policy. See NAL, 699 F.3d at 261, 263-64; NML, 2013 WL
4487563, at *8-10. In its most recent opinion, the court devoted much of its discussion to arguing that
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explain how these interests are served by an injunction that allows the
sovereign to comply by breaching its contracts en masse. Nor have the courts
explained how the effort to collect ordinary debt claims on behalf of a subset of
Argentina's holdouts justifies the sure impact of the injunction on financial
market utilities in and outside the United States or the risks of default to
exchange bondholders and Argentina's economy.148
Perhaps the courts have assumed these impacts to be trivial, or have seen
the third parties as too-closely affiliated with Argentina. But they have not
elaborated on any such assumptions.
The public interest is a touchy subject for a court contemplating an
injunction against a foreign sovereign. Ordinarily, injunctions that impose
significant costs and risk on third parties are seen as contrary to the public
interest. On the other hand, only by imposing such burdens can the court hope
to induce sovereign compliance. If it takes the public interest seriously, the
court must ask whether the injunction furthers a public interest compelling
enough to justify imposing these burdens, and to justify the court in assuming
the associated reputational risks of noncompliance. The inquiry cannot be
settled by vaguely incanting the interest in "enforcing contracts."
We do not rule out the possibility that an honest and rigorous balancing
test could tip in favor of NML, although we doubt it. To show that the
injunction enhances social welfare, the courts might explain why its remedy
increases the likelihood of compliance by Argentina, fosters respect for the
courts, and creates appropriate incentives for future sovereign borrowers,
creditors, and intermediaries, and also why these benefits outweigh the costs
potentially falling on market utilities, bondholders, Argentine citizens, and
future debtors and creditors. So far, the courts have shied away from such
analysis. We speculate that this may be in part because they simply have too
much riding on the outcome.
IV. Conclusions
Ever since Judge Thomas P. Griesa issued the injunction, hearings at the
district court and court of appeals have been packed with journalists, analysts,
gawkers, and lawyers for the litigants and the dozens of interested third parties.

the case would have little impact as a precedent. Id. at *10. Whether or not that is true, a discussion of
NML's precedential value tells us little about whether the injunction in this case is consistent with the
public interest.
The courts also discount the policy impact of their remedy on other sovereigns and
148.
sovereign debt markets going forward, highlighted in the briefs submitted by the United States and later
raised by the government of France in support of Argentina's petition for Supreme Court review. See
Brief of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal at 5, NML (2d Cir. Apr.
4, 2012) (No. 12-105-cv(L)); Brief for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Republic of Argentina's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7-10, NML, petition for cert. filed, 2013 WL
3225966 (July 26, 2013).
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The hearings make for good theatre, a never-ending drama about the existential
predicament of judging a sovereign. The judges, quite understandably, seem
tired of their roles. They are fed up and want Argentina to pay. At one hearing,
quoting Argentine press reports of the government's latest evasion plan, the
district judge raised his voice: "And steps can be taken, which I will not try to
discuss now, but steps can be taken to sanction any misconduct by the
Republic ... which will not simply amount to allowing the Republic to disobey
judgments and rulings. There will be means of dealing with that."l 49
A year on, Judge Griesa's secret weapon to force compliance remains
secret: Argentina has not paid. Petitions for Supreme Court review have pushed
the likely resolution of the case back, possibly into late 2014 or even 2015when Argentina's president faces an uphill battle for re-election. Her successor
just might pay up, even before the case is finally resolved. 1o NML's strategy
would prove a success, though perhaps more psychic than financial,
considering a decade of worldwide litigation costs. NML v. Argentina might
fizzle out without settling the fundamental issues it has raised.
The problems inherent in injunctions against foreign sovereigns are
among these. In this Feature, we have argued that, to secure compliance, courts
have little choice but to target third parties when they grant injunctions in
sovereign debt cases. To our minds, the temptation to ignore or minimize the
public interest in the gamble to induce compliance is at least as problematic as
the traditional concern rooted in comity. This does not amount to categorical
opposition to injunctions in sovereign debt. But it is an argument in favor of
restraint, and for explicit acknowledgement that a sovereign may not comply
unless the injunction imposes substantial burdens on third parties. A court that
plans to enjoin a foreign sovereign needs to explain why the gamble is worth it.

149. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9,2012) (No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG)).
150. See Felix Salmon, Elliott vs Argentina: It's Not Over Yet, REUTERS, (Aug. 23),
2013, http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2013/08/23/elliott-vs-argentina-its-not-over-yet.
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